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The Future of the Exclusionary Rule:
An Alternative Analysis
for the Adjudication of Individual Rights
INTRODUCTION

The age of automation spares no one as it carries us into a high-tech
future. Every comer of modem life is affected, if not governed, by
computers which improve society by doing things better, faster, and more
efficiently. While computers can process data more quickly, they are also
sometimes blindly relied upon and in the end can produce a carelessness that
far outweighs whatever advantages they have to offer. It may sound clich6,
but a computer is only as good as its user.
Figuring prominently in society's ambitious
Enter "Robo-Cop."
law enforcement agencies, sixty thousand of
our
are
technological leap
whom, according to the American Civil Liberties Union, are connected by
computer to the National Crime Information Center.' Currently, police
forces use mechanisms such as long-range eavesdropping devices that can
pick up conversations one hundred yards away and infrared radar monitors
that can detect weapons on a person a half-mile away.2 Also, more and
more, law enforcement agencies are equipping patrol cars with mobile laptop
computers for instant access to appropriate records.'
For law enforcement officials, computers add to their legions of
weapons that help to level the battlefield in the war on crime. Computers,
if used properly, will "short-cut existing methods for searching motor
vehicle, criminal and other records."4 Error-free computer use by law
enforcement agencies is an unobjectionable means to fight crime. However,
error-free use of computers for information storage and data collection is far
from guaranteed, and the occasional misuse can lead to the false arrest and
deprivation of a person's liberty.
1. Linda Greenhouse, Court Weighs Ramifications of DigitalAge, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
8, 1994, at A21.
2. David W. Chen, Law Enforcement and Privacy Interests Clash on Technology,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at 26.
3. See Wireless Data System Puts Alexandria Police On-line, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 5,
1995; Kenneth C. Crowe II, Laptops Help Fight Crime, TIMES UNION (Albany, N.Y.), June
2, 1995, at B10.
4. Chen, supra note 2, at 26.
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This is the crossroad on which the Supreme Court sat as it was
presented with the plight of Isaac Evans.5 Evans, stopped by an Arizona
police officer for a traffic violation, was searched when the police officer
checked his patrol car computer and discovered an outstanding arrest
warrant. 6 Although a quantity of marijuana was discovered in Evans'
possession, it turned out the arrest warrant was quashed seventeen days
earlier, but due to a lapse in the standard procedure was never removed from
the police computer records.7
Civil libertarians will point out that as long as computers are used in
law enforcement, the potential for such a chain of events as that which led
to the illegal search and arrest of Isaac Evans will be on the rise.8 While
computer-generated error and the resulting illegal arrests make up the factual
background of Isaac Evans' challenge and ultimately the focus of this
article, the true debate over how far the government can go in the trampling
of people's constitutional rights in obtaining successful criminal prosecutions
has developed its own jurisprudence. 9 At the heart of this constitutional
violation is the right to privacy and the Fourth Amendment guarantee that
"the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."' 0
I. THE EVOLVING RIGHT TO PRIVACY
A. THE LIVING CONSTITUTION

The Court has yet to deliver a comprehensive list of what exactly is
contained in the constitutional right to privacy, and, although the 1980s and
1990s have seen a kind of ceiling placed on further expansion," the right
5. Arizona v. Evans, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).

6. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866 P.2d 869
(Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
7. 836 P.2d at 1025.
8. See 58 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA), at 1112 (Nov. 1, 1995) (citing a 10-year-old FBI
study of computerized criminal information systems which revealed that at least 12,000
invalid or inaccurate reports on suspects wanted for arrest are transmitted each day to federal,
state, and local law enforcement agencies).
9. See generally Herbert L. Packer, The Courts, the Police, and the Rest of Us, 57
J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 238 (1966); Charles H. Whitebread, The Burger
Court's Counterrevolution in Criminal Procedure,24 WASHBURN L.J. 471 (1985); Robert
Weisberg, Criminal Procedure Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J.CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 832 (1985).
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
11. See Veronia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (1995) (holding school drug
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to privacy has evolved dramatically in the past century. A broad view of
the right to privacy is "the right to be let alone--the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men.' 2 While this definition
appears to leave much to further elaboration, it could be argued that in its
simplest form, the right to be let alone is the right to be free of any intrusive
or overly offensive behavior. 3 The Supreme Court delivered a now4
famous definition of the right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut,
holding that there are certain relationships lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees and that "specific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 5emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."'1
In order to extend privacy protection to our shared values and beliefs,
the idea of a living constitution or charter may be helpful. Put simply, the
doctrine provides that the Court holds itself to a general definition of
constitutional rights which are open to judicial elaboration in accord with
changing views of fundamental fairness, rather than to endorse a specific
conception of constitutional rights. 6 Often within its fundamental rights
analysis, the Court has had to wrestle with arguments about overgeneralizing
and undergeneralizing original meanings.
1. Support for the Living Constitution
The activist argument provides that the framers chose general language
for future generations to apply. The strength of this point of view rests
primarily on the difficulty created in adopting the intent of the framers with
the passage of time. There are certain situations where the framers' intent

testing permissible for student athletes); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (holding that a physician is required to use reasonable judgment in determining the
viability of a fetus).
12. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
13. For a general discussion on the fundamental right to privacy, see LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1302-1435 (2d ed. 1988).

14. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
15. Id. at 484. More precisely, the First Amendment protects the privacy of an
individual's associations and thoughts, the Third Amendment's facet of privacy prohibits the
quartering of soldiers, the Fifth Amendment prohibits forced self-incrimination, and the
Fourteenth Amendment protects against deprivations of personal liberty by state action. All
of these individual rights have been held to be part of the zones of privacy. See, e.g., Fisher
v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 399 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564-66 (1969);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
16. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 670.
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cannot be determined because the applications might go beyond what the
framers could have contemplated. In other words, the Court is guided by
the concept of fairness, but not by any specific conception of fairness that
7
the framers had in mind.'
Two of the most highly publicized victories for the activist approach
are Brown v. Board of Education18 and Roe v. Wade. 19 In Brown, the
Court held that the Equal Protection Clause outlawed school segregation, 0
while in Roe the Court established a fundamental right to terminate a
pregnancy within the first trimester.2 1 Of course, nothing in the Constitution enumerates the right to attend integrated public schools or to abort a
pregnancy. Support for these decisions lies in the principle that the role of
the judiciary is to expound national ideals of fair play and substantial justice
not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written constitution.22
2. The OriginalistApproach
In the alternative, the "deferentialists" or as they are more commonly
referred to, the originalists, assert the position that the only legitimate way
to interpret the Constitution is to search out and adhere to the intent of the
framers.2 3 The pure interpretivists take the position that anything not
enumerated in the text is a deliberate omission because there is no evidence
that the framers did not contemplate or understand a particular right as
fundamental.24 Furthermore, if courts are allowed to stray from the plain
meaning of the Constitution, it could lead to the "will-o'-the-wisp" of the

17. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977). Professor Dworkin
draws an analogy to a parent who tells her children not to treat others unfairly. She, no
doubt, has specific examples of unfair conduct in mind, but she would assume that her
meaning was not limited to these examples for two reasons. First, she would expect her
children to apply her instructions to situations she had not and could not think about.
Second, she is ready to admit that some particular act she had thought was fair was in fact
unfair.
18. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
19. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
20. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
22. See Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 706 (1975).
23. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF
THE LAW

6 (1990).

24. Because the Court cannot possibly know how the framers would have decided had
they voted on each issue, justices must remain neutral and cannot pick between competing
gratifications.
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entity charged with its interpretation.
Commentators arguing for a deferential approach view the Constitution
as a static document which requires the Court to apply a four-corners rule.
To Judge Robert Bork, constitutional review starts and ends with the Court's
adherence to "neutral principles"25 and its judgments, to be legitimate, must
be derived from the Constitution.26 According to Judge Bork, if the
Supreme Court does not "rigorously adhere to a valid and consistent theory
of majority and minority freedoms based upon the Constitution, judicial
supremacy, given the axioms of our system, is, precisely to that extent,
illegitimate. '21 When the Court makes, rather than implements, value
choices it is acting in a way inconsistent with a democratic society.
Therefore, the legislature makes the value choices and the courts must
accept any legislative value decision.28
3. Deference to the Activists
While the deferential argument possesses some merit, there are
significant arguments supporting the activist approach. First, the passage of
time poses an insurmountable problem for the originalists in that the
framers' views and our present day constitutional issues emerge from
completely different worlds. A series of nineteenth-century events resulted
in the tremendous evolution of our shared values from what they were when
the Constitution was ratified. The Civil War, the Industrial Revolution, and
the immigration wave beginning in the 1880s all worked furiously to alter
or improve the fabric of this nation. Second, there is no other explanation
for the use of such general language. This argument rests on the premise
that every provision in the text has some purpose; some reason to justify its

25. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND.
L.J. 1, 2 (1971) (interpreting HERBERT WECHSLER, TOWARD NEUTRAL PRINCIPLES IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, IN PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961)).
26. BORK, supra note 23, at 3.
27. Id. at 4.
28. However, it was Judge Bork's refusal to accept the concept of unenumerated rights
and liberties that ultimately caused the Senate, the body to which Bork gives so much
deference, to reject his Supreme Court nomination. The Senate voted 58-42 not to confirm
Bork, the largest margin of defeat ever for a Supreme Court nominee. See Nomination of
Robert H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court,S. EXEC. REP.
No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (October 13, 1987); see also SUSAN LOW BLOCH & THOMAS

G. KRATTENMAKER,

SUPREME COURT POLITICS: THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 143
(1994); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT & THOMAS D. ROWE, JR.,. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY-

ARGUMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 10-11 (1993).
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existence in the document. The Commerce Clause,29 the Establishment
Clause,30 and the Privileges and Immunities Clause 3' are examples of
sweeping statements that require judicial interpretation in order to give them
substance. While it is clear that the framers had a specific intent with some
enumerated provisions, enough broad provisions exist to rationalize the need
for judicial elaboration, without which constitutional review would often
amount to a kind of judicial meltdown. A third proposition is that the very
power of judicial review rests on this idea of constitutional elaboration.
Chief Justice Marshall's authority, in Marbury v. Madison,32 for reserving
the power of judicial review was that the courts were charged with
interpreting the law and the Constitution is the paramount or supreme law.
Essentially, Justice Marshall read into the Constitution in order to obtain the
power of constitutional interpretation.
The framers created an ingenious dichotomy by enumerating specific
provisions while leaving others more general. The specific language is
designed to deal with problems of the day as well as future issues to the
extent that the framers were able to contemplate them. However, if the
document were to have any duration, the framers knew that two powers
must be reserved for future generations. First, the power to amend is
granted to future legislatures who, as representatives of the people, have the
duty to enact laws pursuant to the wishes of their constituents and not the
wishes of the ratifying constituents. Second, the power to interpret is given
to the judiciary, which if it is to be an effective check on the legislature,
must have some freedom to apply the broad provisions. Support for an
activist approach then lies in the principle that the broad textual provisions
are viewed as sources of legitimacy for judicial development and explication
of basic shared national values.33
Taking the living Constitution in conjunction with the idea of
fundamental rights leads to a conclusion that while the Constitution as a
document remains static, the Constitution as a concept which represents
individual rights changes as our shared values change. Constitutional
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power . . . To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
30. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion").
31. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all
Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States").
32. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
33. See Grey, supra note 22, at 706 (defining the living constitution as "a constitution
with provisions suggesting restraints on government in the name of basic rights, yet
sufficiently unspecific to permit the judiciary to elucidate the development and change in the
content of those rights over time .....
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interpretation serves both as a reminder of values to be preserved and to
preserve values not yet realized. As Justice Brennan put it, a constitution
that adheres strictly to a deferential approach "does not recognize that times
change, does not see that sometimes a practice or rule outlives its foundations."34
B. THE LIVING CONSTITUTION AS A SOURCE OF PRIVACY PROTECTION

Even if there is an agreement that constitutional concepts evolve as
shared social ideals evolve, defining exactly what the shared values of our
society are at a given time is nearly impossible. Consequently, any Supreme
Court decision based on social values will inevitably be infused with the
subjective values of each Supreme Court justice. 35 However, when the
social change is a direct result of some technological advancement, then the
accompanying constitutional doctrine, arguably, can be a more precise
reflection of the technological improvement.
The concept of a living charter contemplates the application of the
framers' value judgments to new or changed factual circumstances.36 The
most apparent example of the living constitution at work is in the area of
protected privacy. The fundamental right to privacy has been held to
encompass contraception, 37 procreation, 38 and abortion, 39 but not to
homosexual sodomy4 ° or the right of an adulterer to take part in the life of
the child he conceived with a married woman.4 ' In any situation where the
Court must decide whether a particular activity is to be protected as a right
to privacy, the Court has only the enumerated provisions of the Constitution.
Of course, nowhere in the text are contraception, abortion, family matters,
procreation, or homosexual sodomy enumerated. The framers would have
had no reason to contemplate abortion because the technology for a safe
pregnancy termination did not exist.
Likewise, the framers had no cause to consider the effects of computerized data collection or the unfair results when errors are made in the

34. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 141 (1989) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
35. But see Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
269, 294 (1975) (expressing a concern that when the Court announces a new doctrine, its
action is less a reflection of social change than an attempt to engineer it).
36. Grey, supra note 22, at 710.
37. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
38. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
39. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S: 113 (1973).
40. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
41. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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computerized processing of arrest and search warrant information. When a
technological breakthrough forms the basis of a constitutional challenge, it
is impossible to give deference to the will of the framers. One could always
argue that a particular alternative is what the framers would have employed
had they been faced with that situation, but there is no real point to this
approach. The living constitution forces the Court to examine a change in
society within the context of the present society. To ask what the framers
would have done had they been presented with the problem of individuals
being unlawfully arrested due to computer error is ridiculous since the fabric
of this nation has evolved considerably over two hundred years. In other
words, the framers had issues of their day just as the current justices have
to wrestle with issues of today. The Constitution was written to endure, and
the intent of the framers is much more grand than the enumerated provisions. The relevant question, then, is not what the framers would have done
with this problem of computer error but rather how would the framers have
dealt with this problem if they had two hundred years of hindsight into our
changing society. The history and tradition of our Supreme Court is to look
at the surrounding facts, circumstances, and shared values relative to our
particular civilization, subject to growth and change, and determine on a
case by case basis whether some act or procedure is protected as part of the
fundamental right to privacy.
II. SUPPRESSION: THE FOURTH AMENDMENT GUARANTEE OF PRIVACY
A. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN GENERAL

The Fourth Amendment privacy guarantee often centers around the
issue of whether the fruits of a search or seizure are to be admitted into
evidence in a criminal case. 42 In particular, when evidence has been
wrongfully obtained, exclusion is the sanction levied against the government.
The exclusion of good, hard evidence often triggers passionate debates
between individual rights proponents and those who advocate a tough stand
on crime. The nonexclusionists argue that it makes no sense to discard
hours of police work on a bona-fide crime when the evidence could be used
in a conviction. Their position asserts that allowing guilty criminals to go
42. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 3 (2d ed. 1987). See generally
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (holding confessions to be the fruit of an illegal
arrest); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) (holding verbal evidence to be the
fruit of an illegal search and seizure); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920) (regarding the illegal viewing of documents).
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free only encourages more criminal activity and if the police see guilty
criminals walking free on a technicality, then there is no incentive for the
police to do their job.43 These nonexclusionists might even use shocking
crimes of the century to point out. the need to catch and convict heinous
criminals at whatever cost.
There is, sometimes, an unacceptable cost to pay in order to obtain a
conviction. That cost is, of course, the trampling of our constitutional right
to privacy. Certainly it is outrageous to let guilty criminals walk the street,
but individual rights advocates are less interested in the particulars of a
single crime than they are in the protection of every person's liberty and
freedom from intrusive government. The reply then is simply that the
Fourth Amendment is part of our living constitution, and without the
sanction of exclusion--that constitutional provision which protects us from
unreasonable search and seizure--is void of any meaning. What value is
there in a law that says that the government cannot invade people's privacy
if the government is going to disregard it and not pay any price?
The sanction of exclusion can also be argued for as part of the Court's
counter-majoritarian role. The legislature is the voice of society. If society
does not accept exclusion as a workable solution or wants to soften the
standard for obtaining evidence, then its resolve is through the democratic
process. It is, however, the job of the courts to interpret the law and to the
extent that the law has privacy protections, they must be adhered to.
Finally, it must be remembered that the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy is unlike any other privacy guarantees in that there is no way to give
back that privacy. If the fundamental right to live with your extended
family has been deprived, 44 the remedy is simply to allow the individual
to live with her extended family. Likewise, if the right to attend private
schools 4 or to learn German 46 is deprived by statute, then these family
decision-making rights are easily returned. But try to think of an easy way
for an innocent search victim to get back the private matters which were
intruded upon. The only alternative is to prohibit the government from
using what they found against the search victim. Unfortunately, there is no
way to protect the innocent people whose Fourth Amendment rights were
violated. Therefore, the sanction of exclusion, while protecting the guilty
from justice, works to deter future violations of innocent people's constitutional rights.

43.
44.
45.
46.

See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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B. FORMATION OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

1. Nineteenth-Century Roots
Turning to the exclusionary rule, a brief history of its foundation and
development will be useful. The Supreme Court, in Boyd v. United
States,4' found that a statute compelling the disclosure of private papers
that were evidence of a crime amounted to an unreasonable search and
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.48 At this point, the Court
had no remedy for such an invasion of one's "indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property '49 as there is no way, once
an individual's right to privacy has been violated, to merely "return" that
amount of privacy to which the individual has already been deprived.
However, the Court found that the obligatory production of a man's
private papers is akin to the compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony,5 ° which is addressed in the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 5' Consequently, the Court found that mandatory suppression,
the remedy for those circumstances where testimony is obtained in violation
of the Self Incrimination Clause, is applicable to the forced production of
papers, in violation of the illegal search and seizure provision of the Fourth
Amendment. 5' It is this link between the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments which began the great controversy over whether evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment is to be suppressed.
The exclusionary rule was revisited in Weeks v. United States53 where
the Court reversed a conviction in federal court for using the mail to
transmit lottery tickets.54 The purpose of applying the remedy of exclusion
was to protect against the invasion of privacy,55 brought on by the forced
47. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
48. Id. at 630. Pursuant to a federal customs act, Boyd was ordered to produce
invoices for the purchase of glass which the government had accused him of smuggling into
the country. Id. at 618.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 633 (reasoning that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be
used in evidence against him is not substantially different from compelling him to be a
witness against himself).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself").
52. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 638 (concluding that the notice to produce the paper and the law
which authorized the order were unconstitutional and void).
53. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
54. Id. at 398-99.
55. Id. at 398 (holding that it was not within the authority of the federal marshal to
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production of personal papers and in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
However, Weeks possesses only a limited application since it dealt with a
federal prosecution and the rights implicated were the defendant's Fifth
Amendment due process rights. Weeks leaves open the question of whether
the Fourth Amendment alone is sufficient authority for the application of the
exclusionary rule. The Court did note, however, that the Fourth Amendment
is not a viable remedy for an individual accused in a state court because the
Fourth Amendment does not apply to the states.56
2. The Exclusionary Rule and the Incorporation Controversy
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to put both the issue of
exclusionary authority and the issue of incorporation of the Fourth
Amendment to rest in Wolf v. Colorado.5' The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment applies to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that the right to privacy is at the core of
the Fourth Amendment and, therefore, "implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty.""8 The Court applied a fundamental rights interpretation in holding
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 59 Although the Court incorporated the Fourth Amendment
into the Due Process Clause, 60 it refused to include the exclusionary rule,
holding that in a state court prosecution of a state crime, there shall be no
constitutional prohibition of the admission of evidence obtained by an
unreasonable search and seizure. 6' In so doing, the Court determined that
the exclusionary rule is not an inherent and necessary corollary to the Fourth
Amendment, but rather it is a judicially created remedy applicable only in
federal courts. 62 Consequently, the exclusionary rule was not incorporated
invade the house and privacy of the accused).

56. Id.

57. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
58. Id. at 27-28 (finding that the security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion

by the police is basic to a free society).

59. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 n.4 (1938) (explaining that
there may no longer be a presumption of constitutionality when government action falls
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution).
60. Wolf, 338 U.S. at 27-28.
61. Id.at 33.
62. Id.at 28 (holding that the rule in Weeks, suppressing the evidence, was not derived
from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amendment but that the decision was a matter
of judicial implication). Since the Court's supervisory power extends only to federal court
proceedings, any remedial device derived by the Court has no application to the individual
state court proceedings. Had the Weeks Court relied on the Fourth Amendment, then the
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into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While Wolf held that the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the states
because of the fundamental right to privacy, it rejects the argument that the
exclusionary rule accomplishes this goal. 6' The Court held that there are
other ways to protect the right to privacy,' and that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule is not to protect an individual's liberty, but rather it is to
be used as a deterrence against unreasonable searches.65
In dissent, Justice Murphy voiced a strong argument that suppression
is the only viable remedy. 66 Justice Murphy examined three remedial
devices: exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, criminal prosecution of
violators, and civil action against violators in the action of trespass. 67
However, Justice Murphy held that of the three, suppression is the only
alternative. 68 He dismissed criminal prosecution because there can be no
reasonable expectation that a prosecuting attorney will prosecute himself or
his associates. 69 Furthermore, Justice Murphy found that, although civil
suits against police and prosecutors who violate the Fourth Amendment may
well be successful, they carry little practical weight because the damages
awarded will be nominal, since the measure of damages is simply the extent
of the injury to physical property.70
Court in Wolf would have been compelled to exclude the evidence based on its application
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause to the states.
63. Id. at 30-31.
64. Wolf, 338 U.S. 25, 30 n.1 (1949) (offering an extensive list of the common law
remedies). For example, some states permit actions for damages against searching officers
who procure the issuance of a warrant maliciously and without probable cause, while others
permit actions against a magistrate who has acted without jurisdiction in issuing a warrant.
Also, some states permit, without liability, the use of force to resist an unlawful search. Id.
65. Id. at 31 (reasoning that the exclusion of evidence may be an effective way of
deterring unreasonable searches).
66. Id. at 44 (Murphy, J., dissenting).(arguing that exclusion is the only remedy to
deter violations of the Search and Seizure Clause).
67. Id. at 41 (Murphy, J., dissenting); see also People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905, 913
(Cal. 1955) (concluding that administrative proceedings against the offending police officers
will be ineffective in suppressing lawless searches and seizures because police are unlikely
to report themselves or each other).
68. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 44 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 42 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (pointing out that one cannot reasonably "expect
a district attorney to prosecute himself or his associates for well-meaning violations of the
search and seizure clause during a raid that the district attorney or his associates has
ordered").
70. Id. at 43 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (holding that an officer can, if he or she searches
with care, avoid causing any real property damage). Furthermore, punitive damages are not
practical because some states do not permit or limit them and those that do permit punitive
damages require a showing of ill will or malice. Id.
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Twelve years later, the Court reversed its position in Mapp v. Ohio.7
The Court determined that the exclusionary rule is of constitutional origin
and that it is an essential ingredient of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.7 ' The police forcibly gained entrance into Mapp's house and
procured "lewd and lascivious books, pictures, and photographs" for which
Mapp was subsequently convicted. 3 At the trial, no search warrant was
produced by the prosecution. 4 Consequently, the evidence obtained by
search and seizure was in violation of the Constitution. Since application
of the exclusionary rule is, by authority of the Constitution, required, the
evidence was inadmissible in state court.7 ' The majority accepted Justice
Murphy's dissenting argument in Wolf, that suppression is the only viable
remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation. 6 Without the sanction of
exclusion, "the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures
would be 'a form of words,' valueless and undeserving of mention in a
77
perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties.
Mapp v. Ohio7 s defined the three commonly accepted rationales of
excluding evidence when it has been obtained in violation of the defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights. 79 The first is to deter a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by removing the incentive to disregard it. s" Deterrence is the
most widely accepted rationale for the exclusionary rule8 ' and it is
typically thought of in terms of deterrence of police misconduct. The
second stated rationale is the preservation of judicial integrity. 2 The

71. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
72. Id. at 657 (reasoning that adaptation of the exclusionary rule by the state courts
is necessary to protect the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy).
73. See State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387, 389-90 (Ohio 1960), rev'd, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
74. Id.
75. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655-56 (reasoning that the substantive protections of due
process to constitutionally unreasonable searches "logically and constitutionally" require that
the exclusion doctrine be included).
76. Id. at 651-52 (recognizing that remedies other than exclusion have been "worthless
and futile").
77. Id. at 655.
78. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
79. Id. at 656, 659.
80. Id. at 656. An earlier opinion had stated that the rule is calculated to prevent, not
to repair. See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
81. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (stressing that the exclusionary
rule's major thrust is a deterrent one); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636-37 (1965)
(accepting that exclusion of illegal evidence is based on the necessity for an effective
deterrent to illegal police action).
82. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (citing Elkins, 364 U.S. at 222).
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Court's major concern with judicial integrity is the destruction of the
government which would result from "its disregard of the charter of its own
existence."" a Finally, Mapp stated a third purpose of the exclusionary rule
which is to educate society by example.8 For instance, exclusion will
explain to society that the government will not profit from its own unlawful
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government.8 5 Also, one commentator suggests a fourth purpose of the
exclusionary rule which is to restore the victims of unconstitutional searches
and seizures that yield incriminating evidence to the position they were in
before the illegality occurred. 6
Weeks and Mapp, together, stand for the proposition that the Court has
both the supervisory authority as well as the constitutional authority to
enforce the exclusionary rule. Nonetheless, soon after Mapp, opponents of
the exclusionary rule were already preparing a new assault.8 7 In United
88
States v. Calandra,
the Court held that the exclusionary rule is a "judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights
generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional

83. Id.; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 13 ("Courts which sit under our Constitution cannot
and will not be made party to lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by
permitting unhindered governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.").
84. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
85. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 17 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338
(1974)).
86. William A. Schroeder, Restoring the Status Quo Ante: The Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule as a Compensatory Device, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 633, 636 (1983).
Professor Schroeder points out that the Supreme Court recognized the necessity of
compensation for a Fourth Amendment violation in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971), and that money damages were recognized as the means of
compensation for an invasion of personal rights in Owens v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622, 651 (1980). However, money damages are speculative if the individual suffers less
tangible injuries such as invasion of privacy or loss of reputation. Furthermore, if the injuries
are tangible, such as the removal of personal effects, then money damages are minimal, *as
pointed out by Justice Murphy in his dissenting opinion in Mapp. Finally, Professor
Schroeder notes that if evidence illegally seized results in a conviction, "the government
could find itself in the absurd position of punishing the individual and then compensating him
because it was punishing him." Schroeder, supra, at 654.
87. See JOHN KAPLAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 215-16 (1978) ("The exclusionary rule is
the worst kind of rule because it only works at the behest of a person, usually someone who
is clearly guilty, who is attempting to prevent the use against himself of evidence of his own
crimes."); see also John G. Miles, Jr., Decline of the Fourth Amendment: Time to Overrule
Mapp v. Ohio?, 27 CATH. U. L. REV. 9 (1977); Malcolm Richard Wilkey, The Exclusionary
Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?, 62 JUDICATURE 214 (1978).
88. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
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right of the party aggrieved."' 9 The Court determined that a witness
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury may not refuse to
answer questions on the ground that they are based on evidence obtained
from an unlawful search because "[w]hatever deterrence of police misconduct may result from the exclusion of illegally seized evidence from
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand
jury proceedings would significantly further that goal."' 90
Other criticisms of the exclusionary rule include its high societal costs
in that it deprives courts of reliable and direct evidence, resulting in the
freeing of persons guilty of crimes, 9' its lack of benefits because it does
not deter, 92 that it benefits defendants in a manner disproportionate to the
degree to which their Fourth Amendment rights were violated, 93 and that
it compensates only those accused of crimes while doing nothing to protect
the rights of the innocent.94 While these criticisms may have some facial
validity, they ignore the real issue which is that there is no other way to
secure the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment. The exclusionary rule is
not designed to protect the guilty from justice. Its purpose is to prevent
unlawful intrusions against the populace. However, when an innocent
person is illegally searched and nothing is seized, the search victim has no
remedy. They have no action in tort or criminal proceedings and the
innocent cannot rely on the criminal justice system or administrative
proceedings to rectify the harm done. 95 Nor can privacy be returned to the
innocent search victim. The argument that if a person is not guilty of

89. Id. at 348.

90. Id. at 341, 351.
91. See Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio and Beyond: The Origins,
Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases, 83 COLUM.
L. REV. 1365, 1393 (1983).
92. Id. at 1395 (citing to Dallin Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 708-09 (1970) (arguing that the exclusionary rule will not

deter significant incidents of illegal police conduct because police are more motivated by a
desire to conform with institutional standards within police departments that place a premium

on arrests than by a desire to conform with the perceived technical rules of the Fourth

Amendment).
93. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490 (1976).
94. Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (stating that the exclusionary rule "is powerless to deter
invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the police either have no interest in
prosecuting or are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some
other goal"); see also John Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. REV.
1027, 1037 (1974) (stating that by definition, the exclusionary rule operates only after
incriminating evidence has already been obtained and "flaunts before us the costs we must
pay for Fourth Amendment guarantees.").

95. See supra notes 67, 69-70 and accompanying text.
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anything, he or she has nothing to worry about is of little help. Oftentimes,
people are guilty of no crime but still have acts or activities that they wish
to keep private and free from government intrusion. For example, what if
a person is unlawfully searched and it is revealed that the search victim is
on prescription medication, has unique or unpopular political ideals, is in
psychotherapy, or possesses pornographic materials? None of these
activities are illegal, yet an individual may well want to keep such
information private. At least, an individual is entitled to keep it private.
But an illegal search victim has no remedy once this privacy has been
invaded. The exclusionary rule's value is in removing the incentive to
illegally search a person under the pretext of the search for criminal
evidence. To say that the exclusionary rule does nothing to protect the
rights of the innocent is nonsense. It is, through its deterrent effect,
protecting the privacy of our innocent populace.
Following Calandra,the precise constitutional status of the exclusionary rule was unclear. Justice Potter Stewart, who joined the majority in
Calandra,commented that Calandrasettles the question of the exclusionary
rule's constitutional basis in its determination that exclusion is not one of
the protected rights, but instead is a remedy designed to effectuate the
Fourth Amendment rights. % If it is only a judicial remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights and not a constitutional guarantee, then
does it apply to the states? Support for the proposition that the exclusionary
rule is part of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments goes back to
Weeks.9 7
C. THE GOOD-FAITH EXCEPTION

1. Development of the Doctrine
The debate concerning the validity of the exclusionary rule raged for
over two decades,98 picking up momentum in Stone v. Powell.99 It is in
96. Stewart, supra note 91, at 1390.
97. Weeks, 232 U.S. at 393 (holding that if letters and

private documents can be seized
and used as evidence, then the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring an accused the
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value and "might as well be
stricken from the constitution"); see also Mapp, 367 U.S. at 662 (Black, J., concurring)
(concluding that when the Fourth Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and
seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendment's ban against compelled selfincrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies but actually requires the

exclusionary rule).
98. See United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that
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Stone where Justice White, in dissent, expressed the view that the exclusionary rule "should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in
those many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an
officer acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with
existing law and having reasonable grounds for this belief.''1° This
"good-faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, which matured into good
law in United States v. Leon, " restricts the exclusionary rule to those
circumstances where members of the law enforcement team have secured
evidence through unreasonable conduct."°
In Leon, a federal magistrate issued the Burbank police a search
warrant, which allowed the police to seize evidence at the defendant's

homes.

3

Subsequently, a federal district court granted a motion to

suppress, holding that the search warrant lacked probable cause under the
Aguilar-Spinelli test.'04
In legitimatizing the good-faith exception, the Court rested on three
rationales:
First, the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police misconduct
rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.
Second, there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and
magistrates are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires application
of the extreme sanction of exclusion. Third, and most important,
"evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusionary rule where it is discovered by
officers in the course of actions that are taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though
mistaken, belief that they are authorized"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981); United States
v. Lamas, 608 F.2d 547, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1979) (Vance, J.,dissenting) (arguing that the
exclusionary rule hinders police in their duties).
99. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
dissenting).
100. Id. at 538 (White, J.,
101. '468 U.S. 897 (1984).
102. Id. at 919-20.
103. Id. at 897.
104. Id.; see Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) and Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969) (the two pronged test that came out of these cases examines the
validity of a probable cause determination. The "basis of knowledge" prong requires that
facts had to be revealed which permitted the judicial officer making the probable cause
determination to reach a judgment as to whether the informant had a basis for his allegations.
The "veracity" prong requires that facts must be brought before the judicial officer so that
he may determine either the inherent credibility of the informant or the reliability of his
information on this particular occasion); see also LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 611-22. The
Aguilar-Spinellitest, which was relied on by the District Court, was subsequently invalidated
by the Supreme Court in a decision prior to its review of Leon. See Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213 (1983).
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we discern no basis, and are offered none, for believing that
exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a
significant deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate. °
The Leon Court determines the legitimacy of the exclusionary rule in
good-faith situations by balancing the costs and the benefits of excluding
evidence,'0 6 whereby evidentiary material is inadmissible only if the
benefits of exclusion outweigh the costs. 7 The Court's premise for using
the balancing approach is that the exclusionary rule is only applicable when
its remedial objectives are best served and these objectives are served only
where the benefits of preventing the use in the prosecution's case in chief
outweigh the costs. 08 The costs are the impediment of the truth-finding
function of the jury and the further cost of letting "some guilty defendants
go free or receive reduced sentences as a result of favorable plea bargains."' 9 The benefits are the deterrence of official lawlessness."0
Although the Court was willing to permit the police to defer to the
detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, it held that deference is not
boundless,"' and that there are four situations where the good-faith
exception does not apply." 2 First, evidence will not be admitted if the
affidavit submitted to the magistrate is given with knowing or reckless
falsity."' Presumably, then, the good-faith exception does apply if the
affidavit is submitted with only negligent falsity. Second, if the magistrate
stops being detached and neutral and starts being an adjunct law enforcement official," 4 then the good-faith exception will not apply." 5 Third,
evidence will not be admitted if the affidavit does not "provide the
magistrate with a substantial basis for determining the existence of probable

105. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984).
106. Id. at 906-07.

107. Id. at 907.

108. Id. at 908.
109. Leon, 468 U.S. at 907 n.6 (citing statistics of studies which indicate the volume
of nonprosecution or nonconviction of arrestees where the exclusionary rule has subsequently
been applied).
110. Id. at 908.
111. Id. at 914.
112. Id. at 914-15.
113. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); see MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(c) (1980) (defining reckless as the conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk).
114. See Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-327 (1979) (holding that a
magistrate who acts as an adjunct law enforcement officer cannot provide valid authorization
for an otherwise unconstitutional search).
115. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
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cause. ' 1' 16 Finally, evidence will be excluded where a warrant fails to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized and,
therefore, the arresting officers cannot reasonably presume it to be valid." 7
Although Leon ostensibly holds that the exclusionary rule applies only to
unlawful police conduct, two of these exceptions to the good-faith doctrine
apply to inappropriate action by non-police officers. In other words, two of
the circumstances where the good-faith exception will not be applied involve
misconduct of non-police members.
The good-faith exception is premised on a distinction drawn by the
Court between the police and a judicial magistrate and on the police
deterrence rational drawn out in Calandra."8 Application of the goodfaith exception since Leon has been a relatively simple task. The reviewing
courts typically compare the offending party with the police to see if the
good-faith exception shall apply. First, it is determined who it was that
made the error resulting in an improper search and seizure. If ihat party is
a member of the police force then the exception does not apply and the
evidence is suppressed. If the offending party is not a member of the police
force and the arresting officer acted in objectively reasonable good faith,
then the exception does apply and the evidence is admitted. However, Leon
specifically provides that evidence will be inadmissible if the magistrate fails
to conduct himself in a detached and neutral manner and becomes, instead,
an adjunct law enforcement officer." 9 Evidently, when a magistrate
reaches a certain level of improper conduct, the evidence obtained is no
longer admissible. Therefore, Leon must stand for something more broad
than police misconduct.
2. Application of Leon
The Court, in Illinois v. Krull, 20 had an opportunity to utilize the
good-faith exception when evidence was seized pursuant to an Illinois
statute subsequently determined to be unconstitutional.' 2 ' The Court

116. Id. at 915.
117. Id. at 923.
118. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916-17 (1984).
119. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914.
120. 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
121. See People v. Krull, 481 N.E.2d 703 (Ill. 1986) (pursuant to the statute, a Chicago
police officer seized evidence used to convict Krull of having stolen vehicles in his junk
yard), rev'd, 480 U.S. 340 (1987); see also ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 95 1/2, Para. 5-401(3)(e)
(1981) (providing that every record required to be maintained under this section shall be
opened to inspection by the secretary of state or his authorized representative or any peace
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applied the Leon standard 122 and held that suppression would be inappro23
priate because the exclusionary rule would have no deterrent effect.
First, legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule.'24
Second, legislatures generally have confined their efforts to authorizing
administrative searches of specific categories of business that require
regulation, and the resulting statutes have been held to be constitutional.'"
Therefore, the Court found that there is "no basis for believing that
legislators are inclined to subvert their oaths and the Fourth Amendment." 126 Finally, the Court answered the last tier of the Leon test by
reasoning that it is logical to assume that the greatest deterrent to the
enactment of unconstitutional statutes
by a legislature is the power of the
27
courts to invalidate such statutes.
3. The Good Faith Exception and Computer-GeneratedError
Arizona v. Evans 2 ' represents the most recent occasion for the
Supreme Court to apply the good-faith exception. 129 The standard procedure for quashing a warrant is for the court clerk to inform the county
sheriffs office that a warrant has been quashed, at which time the sheriffs
office removes the warrant from its computer.13° After calling the sher3
iffs office, the justice court clerk makes a note in the appropriate file.' '
In this case, there was no indication that a clerk called the sheriffs office
to quash the warrant. 3 2 The sheriffs office also had no record of the call,
and as a consequence, the quashed warrant was never entered into the police
computer. 3 3 An Arizona trial court granted Evans' motion to suppress,

officer at any reasonable time during night or day). The statute was invalidated in Bionic
Auto Parts & Sales, Inc. v. Fahner, 518 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. I1. 1981), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 721 F.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1983), because it gave unbridled discretion in making
warrantless searches.
122. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
123. Krull, 480 U.S. at 349.
124. Id.at 350.
125. Id. at 351.
126. Id.
127. Id.at 352.
128. 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
129. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
130. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1188.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.at 1188.
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4 The Arizona
but this decision was reversed by the appellate court."
135
evidence.
the
suppressing
reversed,
Supreme Court
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether
evidence obtained by a police officer who reasonably relied on an invalid
arrest warrant should be excluded as a violation of the arrestee's Fourth
Amendment guaranteed right to privacy. 36 The Court answered the
question in the negative, holding that if the error was the fault of the judicial
court clerk and not that of the37 police clerk, the police have acted in good
faith in seizing the evidence.
In its application of Leon, the Court relied on the exclusionary rule's
deterrence rationale. First, the exclusionary rule was historically designed
as a means of deterring police misconduct and not mistakes by court
employees. 31 Second, the Court found no evidence which would support
a conclusion that court employees are inclined to subvert or ignore the
Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires
application of the extreme sanction of exclusion. 39 Finally, the Court
found no basis for believing that application of the exclusionary rule in these
circumstances will have a significant deterrent effect on court employees
responsible for informing the police that a warrant has been quashed."
In holding that the good-faith exception applies, the Evans Court rested
squarely on the police/clerical distinction, ruling that if the court employees
were responsible for the erroneous computer record, then the exclusion of
4
evidence would not sufficiently deter future errors.' '

D. CHALLENGING THE GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE

1. Why Only Police Misconduct?
While the majority in Evans determined that if the computer error was
made by a judicial clerk then the evidence is admissible, 42 the factors that
were used to make the Leon police officer/magistrate distinction and the
134. State v. Evans, 836 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992), vacated, 866 P.2d 869
(1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
135. State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1185 (1995).
136. Evans, 115 S. Ct. at 1187.
137. Id. at 1193.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1185.
142. Id.
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Krull police officer/legislature distinction are not relevant in the police
officer/office clerk distinction. To illustrate why the distinction made sense
in Leon and Krull, an examination of the purpose of the exclusionary rule
is necessary.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 43 the Court provided that the "purpose of the
exclusionary rule 'is to deter--to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way--by removing the incentive
to disregard it."" 44 The Court did not specify to whom or what deterrence
referred, but other Supreme Court decisions following Mapp considered the
45
deterrence rationale to apply specifically to unlawful police conduct.
As to why the deterrence rationale applies solely to police misconduct and
not to judicial error, legislative error, or computer error is not explained and
no authority is offered in support.' 4 The Leon standard, then, seems to
indicate that there is a fundamental right to not be unlawfully searched by
a police officer acting in bad faith, but that people are essentially entitled to
no Fourth Amendment protection if the illegal search is the result of some
other government body. The Leon majority, led by Justice White, held that
the sole reason for applying the exclusionary rule is for its deterrent
effect. 47 But as noted, the exclusionary rule will also be applied to deter
magistrates from acting as adjunct law enforcement officers. 48 The
judicial integrity rationale was dismissed in a footnote with no explanation, 141 while the government as an educator rationale is never mentioned
in the opinion. Therefore, the cost/benefit analysis is applied solely to the
deterrence rationale. Since the costs of exclusion are always the same, in
that there is a cost of suppressing evidence and possibly losing a conviction,
the determination of which rationale to accept affects only the benefits of
exclusion. Put simply, it is much easier to find that the costs outweigh the
benefits when some of the benefits are not figured into the balance. If
judicial integrity and societal education are included as benefits of exclusion,
then the benefit argument carries much greater force.' 50 The real trouble
143. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

144. Mapp, 367 U.S. at 656 (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
145. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
146. LAFAVE, supra note 42, at 54.
147. Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
148. See supra text accompanying note 119.
149. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984) (holding that judicial
integrity does not require the courts to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment).
150. Contrast this evaluation with Mapp, where the police forcibly entered without a
warrant. Here, there is a clear example of bad faith on the part of a government agency (the
police). Admission of the illegally seized evidence would result in a severe blow to judicial
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with Leon is that it ignores government bad faith outside of police work
even though the Constitution is often violated through errors made by
people other than the police. This reading of Leon has left the exclusionary
rule as the exception to the "good-faith rule."
2. The Government Misconduct Test
Somewhere between the decision in Mapp and the decision in Leon, the
focus of the exclusionary rule was whittled down to police misconduct. As
noted,' Mapp speaks about government misconduct. Why and under
what authority did Leon manage to remove government misconduct from the
purposes of the exclusionary rule? The Leon Court proclaimed that as
neutral officers, judges and magistrates have no stake in the outcome of
particular criminal prosecutions.'5 2 With this point, Justice White seems
to seal the fate of the exclusionary rule. To say that the judiciary has no
stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions is crucial to the
Court's holding and yet no authority is offered to substantiate it. The goal
of the criminal justice system is to punish those who break the law.
Society, of which the judiciary is a part, has an interest in every criminal
prosecution. If justice is viewed as the whole and criminal prosecutions as
the parts, then justice is achieved when all criminals are successfully
prosecuted. The judiciary may not see a particular prosecution as any more
or less important than any other, but to the extent that each criminal
prosecution is another notch in the bedpost of justice, the judiciary has an
interest in prosecuting every guilty defendant which comes before it. If the
rule is accepted as a way to discourage all government misconduct and
deterrence of government misconduct is accepted as a benefit for purposes
of the cost/benefit balance, then clearly the benefits stand a much better
chance of outweighing the costs.
Nowhere is this more apparent than in Evans. On the surface, an
isolated error in the entry of data appears to be a nonmisconduct situation
and the Court treats the invalidity of the arrest as a single, unintentional
computer error. However, the concurrence voiced concerns that such
unintentional errors may become more prevalent and, as a consequence,

integrity because the courts cannot allow in evidence that was obtained through illegal
brutality. An examination of the government as an educator rationale would lead to similar
results as the Court delivered the message that when one engages in brutal misconduct there
are going to be some consequences.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 143-46.
152. Leon, 468 U.S. at 917.
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more serious.' 53 As the use of computers for processing data increases,
the potential for error increases. Justice Souter suggests that the deterrence
rationale should extend to the government as a whole and not just the
police. " The Court was given an excellent opportunity to draw a
distinction between government misconduct/nonmisconduct situations, but
instead opted to rest on the police clerk/judicial clerk distinction. The result
is a narrow holding whereby this isolated, unintentional error by a judicial
clerk does not result in suppression because the arresting officer reasonably
The Court left for another day
and in good faith relied on the warrant.'
the decision on what to do if and when computer errors increase to a
magnitude where large numbers of arrests are being made based upon
invalid warrants. The concurrence, however, makes it clear that it only
agrees with the narrow decision dealing with the single error involving the
petitioner Evans' warrant.'56
Because the use of computers in the area of judicial and law enforcement recordkeeping is on the rise, there will be a day where such errors are
much more commonplace. More and more, the courts will be faced with the
problem of how to deal with the high number of computer errors that are
being made by clerks even though these clerks are, in fact, doing their best
under the circumstances. A society that includes a large number of clerical
computer errors and a comparable number of illegal arrests is intolerable and
the parties responsible must be held accountable. Who is it that must
shoulder the blame when clerks are making computer errors which result in
arrests in violation of the Fourth Amendment? If we accept, arguendo, that
each individual clerk is doing the best job that he or she is capable of, then
the answer must be the government officials charged with supervising the
computer clerks. Whoever has the responsibility to see to it that the
computer clerks in their department are properly entering data must be held
accountable for the errors that these clerks are making. Whether it be the
police chief, the mayor, the city council, or any other government official
that supervises computer clerks, they are responsible for preventing clerks
from making computer errors. If the clerks are doing the best that they can
and they are still making errors, then it is their supervisor's job to ensure
that computer errors cease. It is the government's responsibility to make
sure people are not falsely arrested, and in situations where citizens who are
entitled to protection by the government are being arrested by the government, then the government is at fault.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Evans, 115
Id. at 1195
Id. at 1194
Id. at 1195

S. Ct. at 1194-95 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
(Souter, J., concurring).
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
(Souter, J., concurring).
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There are three explanations as to why clerks make computer errors.
The first is financial considerations in that there is either a need for a greater
number of computer clerks or there is a need for more competent clerks.
Either consideration will cost money to cure because more clerks will result
in a greater volume of clerks at the same wages while more competent,
better trained clerks will command higher wages. A second possibility that
clerks are not prevented from making errors is that their supervisors know
that they are making the errors and are doing nothing about rectifying the
problem. A third possibility is that the clerks and the police are in
conspiracy. No matter what the reason for the errors, misconduct surfaces
when a supervisor knows that computer errors are taking place and fails to
correct the problem. This is at least a conscious disregard of a substantial
risk.
If government misconduct is accepted as the rationale for the exclusionary rule and the rule applies whenever the objective of deterring government
misconduct will be served, then the first step is to determine why the
unlawful search and seizure or arrest was made. If the Fourth Amendment
rights of a person were violated through some fault of any government
employee, agency, or body, then the exclusionary rule is triggered. The next
step would be to determine if the good-faith exception should apply and
here the relevant issue would be the determination of whether there is any
fault. Leon provides that when the conduct is objectively reasonable,
excluding the evidence would not further the ends of the exclusionary
rule. "57
' The Court in Leon goes on to say that "suppression is appropriate
only if the officers were dishonest or reckless" or could not have any
objectively reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause.'
Therefore, Leon sets the boundaries for the standard of fault at recklessness
and intent. 159
After the offending party has been discovered, the next question is that
person's level of fault. For example, in Leon, if the magistrate only
negligently granted a warrant lacking in probable cause, then the magistrate
acted in good faith and the exclusionary rule would serve no purpose in
serving to avoid the recurrence of this problem. But if the magistrate acted
with a conscious disregard of a substantial risk, then this misconduct must
be deterred through the only means available; suppression. Closer to home
157. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919-20 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465, 539-40 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)).
158. Leon, 468 U.S. at 926.
159. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (1980) (defining purpose as the conscious
object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result); see also supra note 113
(defining reckless).
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is the conduct of the computer clerk supervisors, and when their conduct is
reckless. It is difficult to say with certainty how many illegal arrests it takes
before a supervisor knows that she has a problem on her hands that she
must correct, and this standard is not one which this author intends.
Everyone has their own idea of how much is too much and it obviously
varies with each department's case load and the community's population.
The point is that when "too much" has been reached, it is misconduct on the
part of the manager to not correct the problem of illegal arrests. For these
reasons the exclusionary rule should be applied to all government misconduct: because Mapp speaks of all government misconduct, because there is
no authority for holding that magistrates, legislatures, clerks, or any other
government officials are less likely to ignore the Fourth Amendment than
are the police, and because Leon specifically accepts that when there is
misconduct by a party other than the police, the exclusionary rule is applied.
3. Applying the Government Misconduct Test
To illustrate the validity of a government misconduct approach, it
would be helpful to apply the test to state court cases where a criminal
defendant has sought to suppress evidence that was obtained in violation of
the Fourth Amendment and where Leon was applied. In People v.
Turnage,'" the defendant, Raymond Turnage, was released on bond after
a valid arrest warrant was executed and he was taken into custody. 61 The
day after Turnage was released, a grand jury indicted him on the same
charge and, shortly afterward, he was arrested by a police officer relying on
the repetitive warrant. 62 The precise facts are that the arresting officer,
after having seen Turnage's name on an active warrant list, pulled Turnage
over, called the sheriff's department to confirm that the warrant was valid63
and then proceeded to search Turnage, discovering a gun and narcotics.
The Illinois Supreme Court suppressed the evidence because the good-faith
standard was not satisfied.' 64 The court found that deference to the
probable cause determination of a judge or a magistrate is simply not the
same as deference to a police radio transmission concerning the existence
of a valid warrant. 65 Therefore, the collective law enforcement agency

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

642 N.E.2d 1235 (II!. 1994).
Id. at 1236.
Id.
Id. at 1236-37.
Illinois v. Turnage, 642 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (II1. 1994).
Id. at 1240.

1996]

THE FUTURE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE

acted in bad faith.' 66 In dictum, however, the court notes that suppression
of the evidence would further the deterrent purposes of the exclusionary rule
where either the state's attorney or the sheriffs department could be charged
with knowledge of the repetitive nature of the warrant. 167 Although the
result in Turnage is correct, the deterrence rationale is confined to the police
and suppression, therefore, is based on the deterrence of a procuring officer
from relying on colleagues who are ignorant of the circumstance under
which the warrant was obtained.'8 Under the government misconduct
approach, the questions why a repetitive warrant was procured, and by
whom, must be answered to determine that person's standard of fault. If,
upon presenting evidence to the judge in request for a grand jury indictment
of Turnage, the state's attorney consciously disregarded the warrant's
repetitive nature, then the state's attorney has met the appropriate level of
misconduct for suppression. The exclusionary rule would have served to
prevent future cases of prosecutors knowingly or recklessly seeking a
repetitive warrant.
A second case, more closely related to the facts of Arizona v.
Evans,'69 is State v. White, 70 where the defendant, David Allen White,
was pulled over for a minor traffic infraction and searched.' 7' The
arresting officer, relying on an outstanding arrest warrant, found contraband
in White's possession. 72 The warrant was invalid, but due to an error in
the computer at the sheriffs office it appeared to the arresting officer as
outstanding. 73 The Florida Supreme Court held that the evidence was
appropriately suppressed 74 because the exclusionary rule's purpose of
deterring police misconduct would be served by encouraging police to
maintain up-to-date and accurate computer records. 75 The good-faith
exception is inapplicable, the court noted, because knowledge of the invalid
warrant was within the collective knowledge of the sheriff's office.' 76 The
White court, while expressing the concerns cited by the Arizona Supreme
Court that taking a person into custody because of computer error is
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1241 (noting that where there was knowledge of the repetitive nature, the
rule would deter fishing expeditions and provide an incentive to keep accurate records).
168. Illinois v. Turnage, 642 N.E.2d 1235, 1240 (Ill. 1994).
169. 115 S.Ct. 1185 (1995).
170. 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1995).
171. Id. at 664.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1994).
175. Id.
176. Id.
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repugnant to the principles of a free society,'" nonetheless rested on the
fact that the computer error was the fault of the police department. 7
Application of the government misconduct test leads to the same result
since the police are, of course, government agents. However, drawing the
line between police and nonpolice error is arbitrary and illogical. No
evidence is given in White (or Evans for that matter) indicating that a police
computer clerk is any more motivated by the successful prosecution of a
particular case than is the magistrate in Leon, the legislature in Krull, or the
judicial clerk in Evans. Therefore, since the collective police department
was reckless in that it consciously disregarded the substantial risk of
executing a quashed warrant, it is guilty of misconduct and the good-faith
exception should not apply.
Thus far the discussion concerning government misconduct has asserted
that the Fourth Amendment requires suppression of evidentiary materials
wrongfully obtained through reckless government conduct. To establish the
exclusionary rule is part of the Fourth Amendment, that assertion, in Leon,
which provides that the rule is a judicially created remedy and not a
constitutional right of the party aggrieved is viewed as dicta.'7 9 To the
extent that the government misconduct test adds to the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, it merely states that admission of wrongfully obtained
evidence is a Fourth Amendment violation.
III. EXCLUDING EVIDENCE IN THE NAME OF DUE PROCESS
If Leon's pronouncement that the exclusionary rule is not protected by
the Fourth Amendment and is instead a judicially created remedy designed
to safeguard the Fourth Amendment is accepted, arguendo,the rule may still
have constitutional shelter if it is viewed as a fundamental right. Under this
notion of fundamental rights, when the government has acted in bad faith,
then the exclusionary rule is a protected interest within the parameters of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
This view of the exclusionary rule as a protected liberty can be traced
to Weeks where the Court found a constitutional impediment to admitting
in a federal trial the fruits of a federal agent's search. 180 The Court found

177. Id. ("As automation increasingly invades modem life, the potential for Orwellian
mischief grows." (quoting State v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 872 (Ariz. 1994)).

178. State v. White, 660 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 1995).

179. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1973)).
180. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914).
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that the efforts to bring punishment to the guilty are not to be aided by the
"sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law
of the land."'' Other than helping to define the exclusionary rule as one
of a protected interest, Weeks is of no assistance since it has no application
to state court proceedings.
A. DEFINING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The traditional analysis of fundamental rights application to the states
begins with the incorporation controversy where Justice Cardozo in Palko
v. Connecticut'8 2 found that fundamental fairness is the settled customs of
civilized society without which ordered liberty would be impossible.8 3
By the 1960s the Court had turned its attention from fundamental fairness
and held that if a right was fundamental to the American scheme of justice,
then it has Fourteenth Amendment application to the states.' The fundamental rights approach remains the modem standard and much of the current
Supreme Court debate regarding the Due Process Clause centers around the
determination of fundamental rights.'85
Returning to the idea of a living constitution, the modem Court's
treatment of the activist versus the deferential dispute is characterized as a
debate over the appropriate level of generality. The most specific level of
generality is one in which all of the relevant facts surrounding an issue are
incorporated to define the issue, while the most broad level of generality is
one which views the issue as general statement which includes a number of
specific rights or sub-issues. An easy conceptualization is the case of
Bowers v. Hardwick,'86 where a man was arrested and charged with
violating a local law prohibiting the engagement in sodomy. 8 7 The
petitioners' constitutional challenge turned on what level of generality the
Court accepted. On the most specific level, the issue is whether there is a
181. Id. Early authority gives support for the equation of due process with the law of
the land. See, e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100 (1908); Murray's Lessee v.
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855) ("The words due
process of law were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words by the
law of the land.").
182. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
183. Id. at 325.
184. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
185. See generally Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
186. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
187. Id.
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fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy, 8 ' while on a broad
level the question is whether there is a fundamental right to be let alone and
whether the right to engage in homosexual sodomy is included in this
right. ' 9 Somewhere in between is the right to privacy in one's own
bedroom. Of course, the likelihood that an issue will be viewed as a
fundamental right drops dramatically the more specifically it is construed.
This is true because fundamental rights are those which are implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty and while there generally is a zone of privacy for
marital relations,'9 ° there is nothing in the Constitution, the traditions and
history of our nation, or prior case law which suggests that there is a
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.
An important case in the discussion of the appropriate levels of
generality and one which splintered the Supreme Court is Michael H. v.
Gerald D. 9' The issue of which level of generality to apply involved a
challenge to a state law which presumed paternity of a child to the husband
of a married woman living with her husband.' 92 In a footnote to Justice
Scalia's plurality opinion, he stressed adaptation of the most specific level
of generality which in this case required an examination of whether there is
a societal tradition regarding the natural father's rights of a child adulterously conceived. 93 For Justice Scalia, the most specific level of generality,
as a matter of law, should be referred to in determining the "relevant
94
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right."'
However, Justice Scalia lost his majority when Justice O'Connor, concurring
in the result, refused to accept the footnote.'95 Justice O'Connor first
pointed to decisions by the Court which did not apply the most specific
level of generality.' 9 In refusing to adopt a specific level of generality

188. Id. at 187.
189. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
190. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

191. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
192. Id. at 110 (CAL. EvID. CODE § 621 provides that a child born to a married woman

living with her husband who is neither impotent nor sterile is presumed to be a child of the
marriage).
193. Id. at 127 n.6.
194. Id. at 128.
195. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 132 (1989) (O'Connor,J.,
concurring).
196. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters such as whether to bear children versus the right to
distribute contraceptives); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to enter into marriage
with the person of one's choice versus the right of a white woman to marry a black male in
the South); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (fundamental right to conduct
marital affairs in the privacy of one's bedroom versus the right to use contraception).
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as the sole means of analysis, Justice O'Connor said that she would not
"foreclose the unanticipated by the prior imposition of a single mode of
historical analysis."' 97 Finally, Justice Brennan, in an impassioned dissent,
held that the role of "tradition" should be limited in interpreting the
Constitution because our society is a "facilitative, pluralistic one, in which
we must be willing to abide someone else's unfamiliar or even repellent
practice because the same tolerant impulse protects our own idiosyncracies.

, 198

The recognition of fundamental rights offers the citizenry a greater
level of constitutional protection because once a fundamental right has been
established, the burden shifts to the government to show three things: (1) a
compelling interest; (2) that its action is necessary and not merely rationally
related to the compelling interest; and (3) that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve only the legitimate state interests at stake. 99 When determining
the state's goal, the issue of levels of generality is, again, an important one
to resolve because the more broadly stated the purpose is, the greater the
likelihood that it will be deemed legitimate and the easier it will be for the
government to show that its means are sufficiently narrowly tailored.
B. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR THE CRIMINALLY CHARGED

1. Bodily Extractions and Coerced Confessions
Applying a due process evaluation within the context of the criminal
justice system is not all that novel an approach. A defendant has the right
to be tried according to the substantive and procedural due process
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 200 The Court has had occasion
to apply due process to government misconduct in at least two areas of
investigation of criminal activity. The first cluster of problems is the
consideration of when and under what conditions the government may
extract from a suspect's body a substance for evidentiary purposes. The
Court, in Rochin v. California,20 ' determined that forcibly detaining a
suspect and directing a doctor to pump the suspect's stomach against his
will is the kind of government behavior that offends the community's sense

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 132 (O'Connor, J., concurring.).
Id. at 141 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 545 (1961).
342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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of fair play and decency and which "shocks the conscience."2 2 Therefore,
the government may not use as evidence the substance forcibly extracted
from the defendant's stomach because these methods violate the Due
Process Clause.20 3 In contrast, where blood was extracted from a suspect
to be used as evidence of intoxication,2 the Court has held that admission
of the blood samples as evidence would not be in violation of the defendant's due process guarantee.2 °8 The distinction between when the evidence
is admissible and when it must be suppressed is the level of the government
misconduct. Taking a blood sample at an accident scene is not misconduct
and taking a blood extraction from an unconscious person or over the
objection of the person might be, at worst, negligent conduct. 2°6 The
taking of a sample of blood under the protective eye of a physician does not
shock the conscience as being so brutal and offensive that it does not
comport with traditional ideas of fair play and decency. 207 On the other
hand, forcing a stomach pump into someone's body is a conscious disregard
for a substantial risk. The risk taken by the police is the suppression of the
evidence obtained and the subsequent detriment to society is the sacrifice of
a potential criminal conviction. Put simply, the police conduct in forcing
a stomach pump into a criminal defendant is reckless or intentional bad-faith
while taking a blood sample is either fault-free or negligent good-faith.
A second set of cases where violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause have occurred during the procuring of evidence is the
area of coerced and involuntary confession. A leading case of physical
coercion where a confession was excluded on Fourteenth Amendment
grounds is Brown v. Mississippi,2°8 where police beat and whipped

suspects until they confessed to certain criminal activity. 2° Clearly, the
behavior of the police in this instance is at least reckless, as they were

202. Id. at 172.
203. Id. at 174.
204. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (blood sample taken from a

conscious person but over his objection); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957) (blood
taken from an unconscious accident victim).
205. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760 (holding that admission does not offend a community's
sense of justice); Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435.
206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (1980) (defining negligence as awareness of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that will result from his conduct).
207. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 435.
208. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
209. Id. at 281-82 (indicating that "[ilt would be difficult to conceive of methods more
revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions of the petitioners,
and the use of the confessions thus obtained as the basis for conviction and sentence was a
clear denial of Due Process.").
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subjectively aware that any confession obtained through brutality was at a
risk of being suppressed. However, in Rogers v. Richmond,2 10 while the
Court affirmed that recklessness is an impermissible standard under the Due
Process Clause, it stated, in dictum, that negligent interrogation tactics will
result in admissible evidence.21' The required behavior, according to the
Court, is that which "does not overbear petitioner's will to resist and bring
about confessions not freely self-determined." ''
The point should now be clear that in condemning on due process
grounds a police practice in obtaining evidence, the Court will require a
showing of reckless conduct. This makes sense because when the conduct
is reckless, there is subjective awareness of a substantial risk that the
evidence will be excluded. Therefore, there exists, in the case of recklessness, bad-faith conduct. On the other hand, where the conduct is only
negligent, there is merely an objective standard of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk.
2. The Exclusionary Rule as a Protected Interest
Applying the due process evaluation to the exclusionary rule, Leon and
Mapp once again offer guidance. Recall that Leon required a showing of
reckless bad-faith in order to suppress illegally obtained evidence on Fourth
Amendment grounds.2' 2 The test for a Fourteenth Amendment violation
is the same in that when the government has acted in reckless bad-faith or
worse, then the evidence obtained shall be excluded from the criminal
proceeding. However, the reasoning is different. Under a Fourth Amendment approach, the evidence must be suppressed because application of the
exclusionary rule is constitutionally mandated when the government has
engaged in misconduct. Under a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, however,
exclusion of evidence obtained when a government official or body has
acted with a-conscious disregard is required as part of the defendant's
protected liberty.

210. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
211. Id. at 544 (police interrogation team threatened to take the suspect's wife into
custody if he did not confess).
211. Id.
212. Leon, 468 U.S. at 914; see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
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3. Deriving a Fundamental Right to be Free From Arrest Due to Faulty
Computer Data
Narrowing the due process evaluation down still further, we turn to the
application of the exclusionary rule when there is government misconduct
in the use of computers. The modem day criminal justice system involves
massive record keeping and, as indicated, the potential for error is high.
Furthermore, it seems apparent that implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
is the need for accurate record keeping. The question then becomes whether
there is a fundamental right to be free from illegal arrest based on faulty
data. The answer turns on the appropriate level of generality. Taking a
pure originalist approach leads to a conclusion that at the most specific level
of generality, there is no enumerated right to have evidence suppressed when
it is the fruit of faulty computer data entry. However, this issue falls into
the category of those problems which the framers could not have contemplated. There couldn't possibly be a history and tradition of suppressing
evidence obtained in reliance of erroneous computer records because
computers are not part of our history and traditions. That is why the
doctrine of a living constitution is important. Taking an activist approach
and looking at the problem of illegal arrests as a zone of privacy contained
within the Fourth Amendment, then one of the due process rights emanating
from the zone is to have the illegally seized evidence suppressed. Therefore, a criminal defendant has a fundamental right to not have evidence used
against him when that individual is wrongfully arrested by a police officer
in reliance of faulty computer data. The remaining question then is the
determination of when an individual has been wrongfully arrested. What
kind of government conduct shocks the conscience should seem clear.
Reckless conduct leading to computer errors which result in illegal
arrests requires suppression of the evidence obtained because to admit the
evidence would violate the individual's due process. When a government
official knows that her clerks are routinely making faulty entries into the
computer systems and that official fails to take corrective measures, then
that official's conduct is reckless and it would be shocking to the conscience
to admit evidence obtained in this manner.
CONCLUSION

The use of computers is highly beneficial to modern day law enforcement. Nonetheless, some balance must be struck where their benefits are
maximized and the harm caused is minimized. To pass the buck, when an
illegal arrest is made, to a disinterested court clerk or to draw an arbitrary
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line between equally disinterested court and police clerks makes a mockery
out of the document which holds our society together. No citizen wants to
see villains walk the streets because somebody made a clerical error, but
those people who consciously allow such errors to take place are just as
guilty. It is the responsibility of the entire legal profession to protect the
document which defines our civilization, and those who are charged with
deciding cases on constitutional grounds must recognize the harm done
when the government is permitted to violate that document.
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